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Abstract
In this note, we explore the implications of cultural preference for education in
an innovation-driven growth model that features an interaction between endogenous
human capital accumulation and technological progress. Parents invest in childrens
education partly due to the preference for their children to be educated. We consider
a preference parameter that measures the degree of this parental or cultural preference
for education. We nd that a higher degree of parental preference for education in-
creases human capital, which is conducive to innovation, but the increase in education
investment also crowds out resources for R&D investment. As a result, a stronger cul-
tural preference for education has an inverted-U e¤ect on the steady-state equilibrium
growth rate. We also analytically derive the complete transitional path of the equilib-
rium growth rate and nd that an increase in the degree of education preference has
an initial negative e¤ect on economic growth.
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1 Introduction
It is well known that the Chinese culture places a very high value on education. In Chinas
Song Dynasty, Emperor Zhenzong (968-1022) wrote his famous Urge to Study Poem in which
an often quoted verse is "in books one nds golden mansions and maidens as beautiful as
jade." Also in the Song Dynasty, a poet, Wang Zhu, wrote in his famous Child Prodigy Poem,
"all pursuits are of low value; only studying the books is high." This cultural emphasis
on education can be traced back to Confucianism, which emphasizes the importance of
education. Studying the origins of this strong preference for education in China, Kipnis
(2011) notes that education "... invokes a system of prestige in which those with educational
accomplishments are marked as superior to the non-educated." Even in the case of Chinese
families in the US, this cultural preference for education still exerts inuences on parental
investment and involvement in childrens education. For example, from their survey data,
Chen and Uttal (1988) nd that Chinese parents have higher expectations on their childrens
academic achievement and spend more time working with children on their homework than
American parents. Furthermore, Chen and Uttal (1988) argue that these di¤erent behaviors
can be explained by di¤erences in cultural values.1 However, is a strong cultural preference
for education necessarily good for the economy? A BBC News article2 discusses the costs
of this "education fever" in China as well as South Korea, which also shares the Confucian
culture, and reports that in South Korea, "the government believes education obsessionis
damaging society".
In this note, we use a growth-theoretic framework to explore the macroeconomic impli-
cations of a strong cultural preference for education. The growth-theoretic framework is
an innovation-driven growth model that features an interaction between endogenous human
capital accumulation and technological progress. Parents invest in their childrens human
capital due to the subjective utility that they derive from their childrens education. We
consider a preference parameter that measures the degree of this cultural preference for
education. We nd that a higher degree of cultural preference for education increases the
accumulation of human capital, which is conducive to innovation, but the increase in edu-
cation investment also crowds out resources for R&D investment. As a result, a stronger
cultural preference for education has an inverted-U e¤ect on the steady-state equilibrium
growth rate. Furthermore, if the degree of cultural preference for education is su¢ ciently
low or high, the economy would be trapped in a stagnant equilibrium with zero economic
growth in the long run.
We also analytically derive the complete transitional path of the equilibrium growth rate
from the initial steady state to the new steady state when the degree of cultural preference
for education increases. We nd that an increase in the degree of education preference has
an initial negative e¤ect on the equilibrium growth rate due to the crowding-out e¤ect of
education investment on R&D investment. However, as the level of human capital increases,
the equilibrium growth rate also increases due to the positive e¤ect of human capital on
innovation. The new steady-state equilibrium growth rate may be higher or lower than the
initial growth rate, depending on the relative magnitude of the negative crowding-out e¤ect
1See also Huang and Gove (2012) for a discussion of Confucianisms inuence on Chinese culture and
educational practice of Chinese families in the United States.
2"Asias Parents Su¤ering Education Fever". BBC News, 22 October 2013.
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of education investment and the positive e¤ect of human capital on innovation and growth.
This study relates to the literature on parental investment in human capital and economic
growth; see for example Glomm and Ravikumar (1992), Glomm (1997) and Futagami and
Yanagihara (2008). These studies focus on human capital accumulation as the sole engine of
economic growth. Instead, the present study considers parental investment in human capital
as well as its interaction with endogenous technological progress. Therefore, this study relates
more closely to the literature on R&D-driven innovation and economic growth.3 Early studies
in this literature do not consider endogenous human capital accumulation. More recent
studies, such as Eicher (1996), Zeng (1997, 2003), Strulik (2005, 2007), Strulik et al. (2013),
Chu et al. (2013), Hashimoto and Tabata (2015) and Prettner and Strulik (2015), explore
human capital accumulation in the R&D-based growth model. However, these studies either
do not explore the e¤ects of parental preference for education or they nd an unambiguously
positive e¤ect of education preference on growth. In contrast, we show that an increase in
the degree of parental preference for education has an inverted-U e¤ect on growth once the
negative crowding-out e¤ect of education investment is taken into consideration.
The rest of this note is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3
explores the implications of cultural preference for education. The nal section concludes.
2 The model
We consider a discrete-time version of the seminal R&D-based growth model in Romer
(1990). We extend the Romer model by considering a simple structure of overlapping gen-
erations and human capital accumulation. Each individual is endowed with one unit of time
to be allocated between leisure, work and the education of her child.4 As in Glomm and
Ravikumar (1992), Glomm (1997) and Futagami and Yanagihara (2008), individuals derive
utility from their childrens education. Furthermore, they supply labor that is embodied
with human capital to earn a wage income. For simplicity, we follow previous studies to
assume that individuals only consume goods when they are old. In this case, they save all of
their wage income when they are young and consume their asset income when they are old.
2.1 Individuals
In each generation, there is a unit continuum of individuals. An individual who works at
time t has the following utility function indexed by a superscript t:
U t = u(lt; Ct+1; Ht+1) =  ln lt + lnCt+1 +  lnHt+1. (1)
lt denotes the individuals leisure at time t, and the parameter   0 captures leisure pref-
erence. Ct+1 denotes the individuals consumption at time t + 1. Ht+1 denotes the level
3See Romer (1990), Segerstrom et al. (1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Aghion and Howitt
(1992) for seminal studies in this literature.
4In this study, we do not consider endogenous fertility. See for example Chu et al. (2013), Strulik et
al. (2013), Hashimoto and Tabata (2015) and Prettner and Strulik (2015) for an analysis of human capital
accumulation and endogenous fertility in the R&D-based growth model.
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of human capital possessed by the individuals child. The parameter  > 0 measures the
degree of cultural preference for education (i.e., the amount of utility that an individual
derives from her childs education). The amount of time et a parent invests in her childs
education determines her level of human capital according to the following equation:
Ht+1 = et + (1  )Ht, (2)
where  > 0 is an education e¢ ciency parameter and  2 (0; 1) is the depreciation rate of
human capital that the parent passes onto her child.5 Following previous studies, we assume
for simplicity that education is the only form of bequest.
Individuals use their remaining time endowment 1  lt   et combined with their human
capital Ht to earn a wage income wt(1   lt   et)Ht. Given that individuals consume only
when they are old, their consumption at time t+ 1 is given by
Ct+1 = (1 + rt+1)wt(1  lt   et)Ht, (3)
where rt+1 is the real interest rate. Substituting (2) and (3) into (1), we can express an
individuals optimization problem as follows.
max
et; lt
U t =  ln lt + ln[(1 + rt+1)wt(1  lt   et)Ht] +  ln[et + (1  )Ht],
taking frt+1; wt; Htg as given. The utility-maximizing levels of lt and et are respectively
lt = 
+ (1  )Ht
(1 +  + )
, (4)
et =
   (1 + )(1  )Ht
 (1 +  + )
. (5)
Substituting (5) into (2) yields the level of human capital at time t+ 1 as
Ht+1 =

1 +  + 
[+ (1  )Ht] , (6)
which is the accumulation equation of human capital and shows that the dynamics of Ht is
stable. Therefore, given any initial H0, Ht always converges to its steady state.
In the steady state, the level of leisure is l = =(1 +  + ), which is decreasing in
, whereas the level of education is e = =(1 +  + ), which is increasing in . The
steady-state level of human capital is H = =(1 +  + ), which is also increasing in .
However, the steady-state level of human-capital-embodied labor supply is
(1  l   e)H = 
(1 +  + )2
, (7)
which is an inverted-U function of . The negative e¤ect of  on human-capital-embodied
labor supply is due to the crowding-out e¤ect of education, which is captured by 1  l e =
1=(1 +  + ). Intuitively, an increase in  causes parents to devote more time to their
childrens education e. As a result, they have to devote less of their time to other productive
activities. Although they also reduce leisure l, the reduction in l only partly o¤sets the
increase in e, resulting into an overall decrease in 1  l   e.
5Our results are robust to  ! 1 (i.e., parentshuman capital does not transfer to their children).
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2.2 Final goods
Final goods Yt are produced by competitive rms using the following production function:
Yt = L
1 
t
NtX
i=1
Xt (i), (8)
where Lt is production labor and Xt(i) is intermediate goods i 2 [1; Nt]. The rms take
as given the output price (normalized to unity) and input prices wt and pt(i). The familiar
conditional demand functions for Lt and Xt(i) are respectively
wt = (1  )Yt=Lt, (9)
pt(i) =  [Lt=Xt(i)]
1  . (10)
2.3 Intermediate goods
There is a number of di¤erentiated intermediate goods i 2 [1; Nt]. We consider the following
simple production process that is commonly used in the literature. Specically, we assume
that one unit of intermediate goods is produced by one unit of nal goods. In this case, the
prot function is given by
t(i) = pt(i)Xt(i) Xt(i). (11)
The familiar unconstrained prot-maximizing price is pt(i) = 1=. Here we follow Goh and
Olivier (2002) and Iwaisako and Futagami (2013) to introduce patent breadth  > 1 as a
policy variable such that
pt(i) = minf; 1=g. (12)
We focus on the more realistic case in which  < 1=.6 Substituting pt(i) =  into (10)
shows that Xt(i) = Xt for all i 2 [1; Nt]. In this case, (11) becomes
t = (  1)Xt = (  1)



1=(1 )
Lt, (13)
where the second equality follows from (10).
2.4 R&D
Denote vt as the value of a variety of intermediate goods invented at time t. The value of vt
is equal to the present value of future prots given by7
vt =
1X
s=t+1
"
s=
sY
=t+1
(1 + r )
#
. (14)
6Given a labor share 1    of roughly two-thirds, the unconstrained markup ratio is 1= = 3, which is
unrealistically large. However, all our results are robust to the case of pt(i) = 1=.
7A new variety invented at time t will only start generating prots in the next period.
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Competitive entrepreneurs employ R&D labor Rt for innovation. The innovation process is
Nt = NtRt, (15)
where Nt  Nt+1   Nt. The parameter  > 0 denotes an R&D productivity parameter,
and Nt captures knowledge spillovers as in Romer (1990). The zero-prot condition is given
by
Ntvt = wtRt , Ntvt = wt. (16)
2.5 Aggregation
Substituting Xt = (=)1=(1 )Lt into Yt = L1 t NtX

t yields the aggregate production
function given by
Yt =



=(1 )
NtLt (17)
and the amount of intermediate goods given by NtXt = Yt=. The resource constraint on
nal goods is
Ct = Yt  NtXt =

1  


Yt. (18)
The resource constraint on human-capital-embodied labor input is
(1  lt   et)Ht = Lt +Rt. (19)
2.6 Equilibrium
The equilibrium is a sequence of allocations fXt(i); Yt; Ct; Lt; Rt; Ht; et; ltg and prices fpt(i); wt; rt; vtg
such that the following conditions are satised:
 individuals choose fet; ltg to maximize utility taking frt+1; wt; Htg as given;
 competitive nal goods rms choose fXt(i); Ltg to maximize prot taking fpt(i); wtg
as given;
 monopolistic intermediate goods rms choose fpt(i); Xt(i)g to maximize prot (11)
taking (10) as given;
 competitive entrepreneurs in the R&D sector choose fRtg to maximize prot taking
fwt; vtg as given;
 the resource constraint on nal goods holds such that Yt = NtXt + Ct;
 the resource constraint on human-capital-embodied labor input holds such that Lt +
Rt = (1  lt   et)Ht;
 the amount of saving equals the value of assets such that wt(1  lt   et)Ht = Nt+1vt.
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3 Cultural preference for education
In this section, we explore the implications of cultural preference for education on economic
growth. Section 3.1 focuses on the balanced growth path. Section 3.2 considers the transi-
tional paths of human capital and the equilibrium growth rate.
3.1 Balanced growth path
Human-capital-embodied labor allocations fLt; Rtg are stationary in the steady state. Then,
(13) implies that t is also stationary in the steady state. As a result, the steady-state version
of (14) simplies to v = =r. Substituting this condition into the R&D zero-prot condition
in (16), we have Nt=r = wt, where Nt = Yt(   1)= and wt is given by (9). Solving
these conditions yields
L =

  1

1  


r

. (20)
The next step is to determine the steady-state equilibrium interest rate r. Wage income
at time t is wt(1   lt   et)Ht = wt(Lt + Rt), which is also the total amount of saving in
the economy at time t. The total value of assets in the economy at the end of time t is
Nt+1vt, which includes the new varieties created at time t. Given the overlapping-generation
structure of the economy, the amount of saving must equal the value of assets such that
wt(1  lt   et)Ht = Nt+1vt , wt(L+R) = (1 + R)Nt=r, (21)
where Nt = Yt(  1)= and wt is given by (9). Solving these conditions, we obtain
(1  )(L+R)
L
=
(1 + R)
r

  1


, (22)
which determines the equilibrium interest rate that equates the amount of saving to the
value of assets in the economy.
Solving (7), (19), (20) and (22) yields the steady-state equilibrium values of fr; L; Rg.
r =

1  

  1


, (23)
L =
1

, (24)
R =

(1 +  + )2
  1

, (25)
which shows that R is an inverted-U function of . From (15) and (25), the steady-state
equilibrium growth rate is given by
g  Nt
Nt
= R =

(1 +  + )2
  1  0, (26)
7
which is also an inverted-U function of . Specically, the growth-maximizing value of  is
given by (1 + )= > 0. To ensure that there exists an intermediate range of  in which
g is positive, we impose the following parameter restriction:  > 4(1 + ). Under this
parameter restriction, there still exists a lower bound value  of  below which g = 0, and
there also exists an upper bound value  of  above which g = 0. In other words, if  = 
or  = , then R = 0. Solving the quadratic function  = (1 +  + )2, we derive the
values of f; g given by
f; g =   2 (1 + )  
p
[  4 (1 + ) ] 
22
. (27)
We summarize these results in Proposition 1 and plot g as a function of  in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Steady-state e¤ect of education preference on growth
Proposition 1 The degree of cultural preference for education has an inverted-U e¤ect on
the steady-state equilibrium growth rate. Under a su¢ ciently low or high degree of cultural
preference for education, the economy is trapped in a zero-growth equilibrium.
The intuition of the above results can be explained as follows. An increase in the de-
gree of cultural preference for education increases education investment and human capital
accumulation. However, it also crowds out productive resources for R&D. Specically, if
 > (1 + )=, then any further increase in  would lead to a decrease in human-capital-
embodied labor supply, which in turn reduces the amount of resources available for innova-
tion. In this case, a stronger degree of cultural preference for education is detrimental to
economic growth. Furthermore, in the R&D-based growth model, the market size needs to be
su¢ ciently large in order for R&D investment to be protable. Therefore, when the degree
of cultural preference takes on a su¢ ciently high or low value, the market size measured by
(1  l  e)H becomes so small that there is no incentive for entrepreneurs to invest in R&D.
In this case, the economy is trapped in a stagnant equilibrium with zero economic growth.
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3.2 Transition dynamics
In this subsection, we derive a closed-form solution for the transitional path of the economy
when the degree of education preference  changes from an initial value 0 to a new value
1. Substituting (17) into (9) yields
wt = (1  )



=(1 )
Nt. (28)
Substituting (28) into (16) yields
vt =
1  




=(1 )
, (29)
which is stationary both on and o¤ the balanced growth path. Substituting (28) and (29)
into (21) yields
wt(1  lt   et)Ht = Nt+1vt , Nt+1 = Nt(1  lt   et)Ht. (30)
Substituting (4) and (5) into (30) yields
gt  Nt+1
Nt
  1 = 
(1 +  + )

Ht + (1  )(Ht)2
  1, (31)
which is decreasing in  for a given Ht due to the crowding-out e¤ect of education investment
but is increasing in Ht due to the positive e¤ect of human capital on innovation. Equation
(31) also shows that the dynamics of Nt+1=Nt is completely determined by the dynamics of
Ht given by (6).
We next determine the transitional path of output. Substituting (15) and (19) into (30)
yields
Nt+1
Nt
= (1  lt   et)Ht , 1 + Rt = (Lt +Rt), (32)
which shows that Lt = 1= even when the economy is o¤ the balanced growth path. As a
result, (17) simplies to
Yt =
1




=(1 )
Nt, (33)
which shows that Yt+1=Yt = Nt+1=Nt at any point in time.
We are now ready to examine the complete transitional e¤ects of a change in cultural
preference for education. Suppose at time t = 0 the economy is at an initial steady state
with  = 0. In this case, the initial value of human capital is H0 = 0=(1 +  + 0), and
the initial steady-state equilibrium growth rate is g0j=0 = 0=(1 +  + 0)2   1. From
(31), we see that when  increases at time 0 from 0 to 1 > 0, the growth rate at time 0
immediately falls to
g0j=1 =

(1 +  + 1)

H0 + (1  )(H0)2
  1 = 1 +  + 0
1 +  + 1| {z }
<1
0
(1 +  + 0)
2
  1 (34)
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given that H0 is predetermined. Therefore, a stronger education preference has an initial
negative impact on growth. Then, at time t = 1, the level of human capital increases to
H1 =
1
1 +  + 1
[+ (1  )H0] = 1 +  + 0
0
1
1 +  + 1| {z }
>1
0
1 +  + 0
> H0, (35)
which determines the equilibrium growth rate at time t = 1 given by
g1 =

(1 +  + 1)

H1 + (1  )(H1)2
  1, (36)
where H1 is given by (35). After the initial decrease, the equilibrium growth rate gradually
increases until it reaches the new steady state given by g = 1=(1 +  + 1)
2   1, which
may be higher or lower than the initial steady-state growth rate given that g is an inverted-U
function in  as demonstrated in (26) and Proposition 1.
Using (31) and the transitional path of human capital in (6), we can also trace out the
complete transitional path of the equilibrium growth rate from the initial steady state to the
new steady state when  increases at time 0 from 0 to 1. From (6), the equilibrium level
of human capital at time t+ s for any s  1 is given by
Ht+s =
1
1 +  + 1

1 

(1  )1
1 +  + 1
s
+

(1  )1
1 +  + 1
s
Ht, (37)
where Ht = H0 = 0=(1 +  + 0) at time t = 0. Then, the equilibrium growth rate at
time t+ s for any s  1 is given by
gt+s =

(1 +  + 1)

Ht+s + (1  )(Ht+s)2
  1. (38)
We summarize the results in Proposition 2 and plot in Figure 2 the transitional paths of gt
when  increases at time 0 from 0 to 1.
Figure 2: Transitional e¤ect of education preference on growth
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Proposition 2 An increase in the degree of cultural preference for education has an initial
negative e¤ect on the equilibrium growth rate and a gradual positive e¤ect on the level of
human capital. As the level of human capital increases, the equilibrium growth rate also
increases. The new steady-state equilibrium growth rate may be higher or lower than the
initial steady-state equilibrium growth rate.
4 Conclusion
In this note, we have explored how cultural preference for education a¤ects economic growth.
Although a stronger preference for education leads to more human capital which is an im-
portant input for innovation, the larger investment in education crowds out resources for
R&D investment. As a result, the overall e¤ect of a stronger cultural preference for edu-
cation on economic growth is ambiguous. More specically, it has an inverted-U e¤ect on
the steady-state equilibrium growth rate. Our simple model also allows us to provide a
closed-form solution for the complete transitional dynamics. We nd that the initial impact
of an increase in the degree of education preference on growth is always negative. However,
this negative initial e¤ect on economic growth can be o¤set by a positive long-run e¤ect
of accumulating more human capital so long as the degree of education preference is not
excessively high.
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